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A Framework to Evaluate
Pharmaceutical Pay-for-Delays:
A Balancing Test Based Upon Reasonableness
Jessica Hudson BechteP
"[A balancing] test arguably represents a wholly new way of settling legal
disputes .... [T]he test wrecks the doctrinal furniture; it unsettles, and
in deed overthrows, the systems of rules worked out by generations of
previous judges."'
INTRODUCTION
T HE United States pharmaceutical market is big business. In fact, as of 2010the it  States continued to lead the world as the largest pharmaceutical
market, accounting for 40% of global sales.' Americans spent over $307 billion
on pharmaceuticals in 2010 and it is estimated that they will spend up to $420
billion in 2015.4 The industry affects most Americans; research shows that 50%
use at least one or more prescription drug each month.5 Since pharmaceutical
companies control access to and affordability of brand and generic prescription
drugs, the public is left at the mercy of these large corporations to develop
generic versions of drugs, which can cost 40% of the relevant branded drug or
less.'
As a policy matter, there is apparent tension between society's interest in
promoting competition in the market to increase the availability of low-cost
generic prescriptions and the pharmaceutical company's interest in profits
and receiving incentives for the creation of novel drugs.' This tension has
manifested itself in pay-for-delays, agreements also referred to as reverse
I JD, expected May 2014, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 86 (1988).
3 INDAGATIo RESEARCH, COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 5
(2011).
4 Id.
5 QUPING Gu ET AL., NATL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF No. 42,
PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE CONTINUES TO INCREASE: U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG DATA FOR 2007-
2oo8, at 6 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf.
6 RACHEL CHRISTENSEN SETHI, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: RECENT TRENDS IN UTILIZATION, EXPENDITURES, AND COVERAGE I (2004).
7 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3 d I87, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2oo6), abrogated by
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (203).
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payment settlements. The way in which we as a society approach and regulate
these pay-for-delay cases will have a lasting impact on the prescription drug
market and thus the availability of novel drugs and affordable generics.
Pay-for-delays arise when a brand drug maker initiates a patent infringement
suit against a potential generic rival and decides, in lieu of litigating, to settle
the matter by paying the generic rival to stay out of the market.' Though pay-
for-delays may appear relatively harmless, the effects are astounding, costing
Americans an estimated additional $3.5 billion each year for their prescriptions
and delaying the entry of generic drugs into the market by seventeen months.'
The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue and circuit courts remain
split on the legality of the pay-for-delay settlements. The Second, Federal,
and Eleventh Circuits have evaluated these settlements using the scope of
the patent test, which favors the pharmaceutical industry and allows reverse
payments in situations where settlements do not restrict competition beyond
the exclusionary zone of the patent.'o However, the Third Circuit recently
adopted a competing test: the quick look test proposed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), which treats reverse payments as rebuttable prima facie
evidence of an antitrust violation." Unfortunately, neither test strikes the
proper balance between innovation and consumer access. This Note advocates
for the adoption of a new balancing test that weighs several factors to determine
whether a reverse settlement is in violation of antitrust laws.
Part I of this Note examines pay-for-delay settlements and how legislation
has opened the door for this type of payment. Part II explains the former
8 See id. at 205.
9 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUM-
ERs BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/oS/20xO/O/1oozI2payfordelayrpt.pdf [here-
inafter FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY]. A Federal Trade Commission Study found that
agreements with compensation from the brand drug to the generic drug delayed the generic's entry
into the market for nearly seventeen months longer than agreements without compensation and
the seventeen months was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Id. at 7.The study cal-
culated the cost of pay-for-delays at $3.5 billion by considering four factors: the consumer savings
that result from generic competition in any given month, the likelihood that a generic manufacturer
and brand name manufacturer will reach a settlement that delays entry in return for compensation,
the length of delay to entry resulting from such settlement, and the combined sales volume of drugs
for which settlements are likely. Id. at 8. The study recognized that this is only an estimate of the ef-
fect of pay-for-delays and presented high and low estimates of savings derived from the data ranges
as S7.5 billion of annual purchaser savings and so.6 billion of annual purchaser savings. Id. at so.
to See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 E3d 1298, 1308-09 (ith Cir. 2012), rev'd and remanded
sub nom., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333,1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(203); In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3 d at 208-09, 213. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc. has since been reversed
and remanded by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., discussed infra; however FTC v. Watson Pharm Inc. is still
good law and relevant for discussion of competing analyses and the proposed balancing test con-
tained in this note.
n In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F3 d 197, 28 (3 d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2849 (2013).
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circuit split, focusing primarily on the prominent case that established the test
for each side, the rationale underlying these decisions, and the disadvantages
of each tests. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's recent decision, FTC v.
Actavis, Inc.,12 which failed to endorse either circuit's test. Part IV suggests a
different framework for courts to use to determine whether a reverse settlement
is anticompetitive. 'Ihis proposed balancing test, based on the reasonableness
of the reverse settlement, better protects the interests of both sides. Part V
concludes, explaining the necessity of a new test and summarizing the factors
to be considered in such a determination.
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The United States pharmaceutical industry's objective is to develop new
drugs in anticipation of realizing additional profits. The process of research and
development for each new drug is time-consuming and expensive: on average,
pharmaceutical companies spend more than $800 million and 11.8 years
to bring a single new drug to market.13 In 2011, pharmaceutical companies
launched more new drugs than in any other year in the past decade, including
nine drugs with new methods to treat existing diseases, thirteen drugs utilizing
existing mechanisms, and twelve orphan drugs that treat rare diseases that
affect less than 200,000 people.14
Once a brand drug is created and FDA-approved, it is relatively
straightforward and inexpensive for other pharmaceutical companies to
manufacture a generic version without the initial investment for research and
development."I The generic versions of brand drugs are beneficial to society
because, on average, generics drugs cost 30% to 80% less than their brand
counterparts.16 Luckily for the public, 80% of prescriptions dispensed in 2011
were filled with generic drugs. Although the majority of prescriptions were
generic, spending on generic drugs only accounted for 27% of total prescription
12 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
13 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE U.S., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19-20 (2oo6), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/ 76xx/doc 761 5/Io-02-drugr-d.pdf.
14 IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED
STATES: REVIEW OF 20II at 6 (2012), available at http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/
Insights/IMS%2oInstitute%20for%zoHealthcare%2olnformatics/IHIIMedicines inU.SRe-
port_201.pdf.
15 C. Scott Hemphill, Payingfor Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1562-63 (2006).
16 About: Generic Medicines, GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, http://www.gphaonline.org/about/ge-
neric-medicines (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); Generic Drugs Effect on the Market, SCRIPNET, http://
www.scripnet.com/generic-drugs-effect-on-the-market/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). In 2007, the av-
erage retail price of a generic prescription drug was s34.34 and the average retail price of a branded
drug was si 9 -51.About Generics: Facts at a Glance, GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, http://gpha.hfwebdev.
com/about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
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sales in the United States." Based upon the ease with which brand drugs are
replicated and the fact that generics are marketed at a fraction of the brand
drug's price, pharmaceutical patent law is important to protect the brand
manufacturer.
Patents protect pharmaceutical companies by providing them with a
limited time monopoly over the development of their brand drugs in exchange
for making the patent application available to the public." Even Judge Posner,
a critic of the United States patent system, has called the pharmaceutical
industry "the poster child for the patent system,"" because the industry needs
patent protection as an incentive for innovation. New drug development costs
hundreds of millions of dollars; the patent term begins to run when the drug
is patented and not when it is made, thereby shortening the effective patent
term and the period during which the pharmaceutical company can recoup
investments; and the cost of reproducing a generic version is very low. 20 Once a
patent expires on a new drug the brand pharmaceutical company stands to lose
millions of dollars in profits. For example, between 2007 and 2012 over three-
dozen drugs lost their patent protection, costing the brand pharmaceutical
companies an estimated $67 billion dollars in annual sales.21
17 IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 14, at 26.
18 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 30756, PATENT LAW AND
ITs APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE
COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 at 2 (2005).
19 Richard A. Posner, Why 7here Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (July
12, 202, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/o 7/why-there-are-too-
many-patents-in-america/259725/.
20 Id. ("The prime example of an industry that really does need [patent] protection is phar-
maceuticals. The reasons are threefold. First, the invention of a new drug tends to be extremely
costly-in the vicinity of hundreds of millions of dollars. The reason is not so much the cost of
inventing as the cost of testing the drug on animal and human subjects, which is required by law in
order to determine whether the drug is safe and efficacious and therefore lawful to sell. Second, and
related, the patent term begins to run when the invention is made and patented, yet the drug test-
ing, which must be completed before the drug can be sold, often takes so or more years. This short-
ens the effective patent term, which is to say the period during which the inventor tries to recoup
his investment by exploiting his patent monopoly of the sale of the drug. The delay in beginning
to profit from the invention also reduces the company's recoupment in real terms, because dollars
received in the future are worth less than dollars received today. And third, the cost of producing,
as distinct from inventing and obtaining approval for selling, a drug tends to be very low, which
means that if copying were permitted, drug companies that had not incurred the cost of invention
and testing could undercut the price charged by the inventing company yet make a tidy profit, and
so the inventing company would never recover its costs. So pharmaceuticals are the poster child for
the patent system.").
21 Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the "Patent Chf", 3 7 U.S.
PHARM. no. 6, June 2012, at 12, available at http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/216/c/ 35 24 9/.
[ VOL.102So4
PHARMACEUTICAL PAY-FOR-DELAYS
A. Hatch Waxman Act
Congress has long recognized the careful balance between patent protection
and the public's need for less expensive generic alternatives: it addressed this
issue with the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, more commonly known as the Hatch Waxman Act.22 The goals of the Act
were to assure that there were adequate incentives to invest in the development
of new drugs and make less expensive generic copies of approved drugs more
widely available. 23 The Act attempted to accomplish these competing goals
by establishing a streamline regime for generic challenges to brand name
pharmaceutical patents while extending the life of brand name patents to
twenty years to compensate for the time necessary to meet FDA drug safety
and efficacy requirements.24
Under the Hatch Waxman Act, after a pharmaceutical company has received
FDA approval of a brand drug-and spent millions of dollars to conduct safety
and efficacy studies-a generic company seeking FDA approval only has to file
an application that demonstrates, among other things, the bioequivalence of its
product compared with the brand.25 This Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) allows the generic company to forgo the expensive safety and efficacy
studies required of the brand companies, therefore decreasing the expense
required to an outlay of only $1 million.26 Further, generic companies have an
incentive to quickly file an ANDA after the brand drug is approved because the
first generic company approved by the FDA receives exclusive rights for 180
days to market the generic drug, thus allowing for a duopoly.2 7 This exclusive
right is worth millions of dollars to a generic drug company because it makes
60-80% of its potential profit for the generic during this 180-day period.28
Generic manufacturers have choices when seeking this FDA approval. They
can apply for post-expiration marketing to secure entry once the brand patent
has expired or, they can seek pre-expiration marketing by asserting that the
brand patent is either invalid or not infringed by the generic drug.29 If the
22 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat.1585.
23 Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for
Delaying the Resolution ofPharmaceutical Patent Litigation, iii COLUM. L. REV. I788, 1792 (201).
2 4 Id.
25 Hemphill, supra note IS, at 1564-65.
26 Id. at 1565.
27 Herman, supra note 23, at 1788-89.
28 Id. at 1797.
29 Hemphill, supra note 15, at i565. "A generic firm might argue that the patent is invalid
because it was procured inequitably, or inherently anticipated by the prior art, or because the drug's
initial testing violates the public use bar. Alternatively, the firm might contend that it has devised a
noninfringing bioequivalent form of the drug-for example, a different crystalline structure of the
same active ingredient, or a different way to accomplish some desirable time-release feature of the
innovator's drug."Id. at 1565-66 (footnotes omitted).
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generic company chooses the pre-expiration marketing route then the brand
pharmaceutical company has forty-five days to bring an infringement suit and
a thirty-month automatic stay is put into place to allow the parties to resolve
the infringement matter. 0'This is the context in which pay-for-delays arise.
B. Pay-for-Delays in the Pharmaceutical Context
Pay-for-delay settlements are an alternative to patent litigation between
brand pharmaceutical companies and their generic counterparts. Once
litigation has begun, the brand pharmaceutical company "has little to gain and
much to lose from litigating through to judgment.... [E]ven a litigation victory
would not likely yield damages because the generic firm has yet to market its
generic product.... [and it] would not stop a different generic manufacturer
from subsequently filing its own ANDA challenging the same patents.""
Additionally, a decision by the court stating that the patent is not infringed nor
invalid would allow all generic drug companies to enter the market, causing the
brand pharmaceutical to lose its patent-conferred monopoly.32
Stuck in a lose-lose situation, the brand pharmaceutical company finds that
it is in its best economic interest to pay the generic manufacturer a payment
in exchange for delay of the generic drug into the market, thereby maintaining
its monopoly." These reverse payment settlements-or pay-for-delays-are
"typically in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars."3 4 Even though a 2002
FTC study found that the generics prevailed in 73% of patent-infringement
disputes that were fully litigated, generics still rather routinely accept the
reverse settlement payment because it is to their economic advantage. Also
concerning, these agreements sometimes extend beyond the patent, keeping the
generic out of the market after the expiration of the patent or prohibiting the
generic company from marketing another product not covered by the patent.
Ultimately, pay-for-delay settlements result in brand and generic companies
splitting the monopoly profits at the expense of consumers, who are denied
access to affordable generic alternatives.37
30 Id. at 1566 & .49.
31 Herman, supra note 23, at I8oo.
32 Id.
33 In reTamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3 d 187,209 (2d Cir. 2oo6), abrogatedby FTC
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Angela Foster, The Impact of Reverse Payment Settlement on
Mediation, NJ. LAW. ILG., April 2ox, at 58-
34 Hemphill, supra note 15, at 1568.
35 FED. TRADE COMMN, GENERIc DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT ExPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 13 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-
drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy-o.pdf [hereinafter FED. TRADE
CoMM'N, GENERIc DRUG ENTRY].
36 Foster, supra note 33, at 58.
37 Herman, supra note 23, at 8ox.
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For example, consider AndroGel, a topical gel that treats the symptoms
of low testosterone in men. 5 Solvay Pharmaceuticals received FDA approval
to sell AndroGel in the United Sates and began marketing and selling the
drug. 9 Revenue from AndroGel sales between 2000 and 2007 totaled over
$1.8 billion.40 Watson Pharmaceuticals then filed an ANDA in 2003 to create
a generic version and sought pre-expiration marketing and patent litigation
ensued. 41 After extensive litigation, Watson determined that its generic would
cost 75% less than Solvay's AndroGel, thereby decreasing sales of AndroGel by
90% and cutting Solvay's profits by $125 million per year.42 Prior to a decision
by the court, the parties reached a pay-for-delay settlement. Watson agreed not
to market generic versions of AndroGel until August 31, 2015.43 In exchange,
Solvay agreed to share AndroGel profits with Watson through September 2015,
with payments to Watson projected between $19 and $30 million per year.4
Pay-for-delays, like the one illustrated in the case of AndroGel, are
estimated to cost the public $3.5 billion per year, translating to $35 billion over
the next ten years. 45 From October 1,2011 to September 30,2012,40 of 140 final
resolutions of patent disputes between brand and generic drug manufacturers
potentially involved pay-for-delays with compensation to the generic company
and restrictions on the generic's entry into the market.4 These pay-for-delay
settlements involved "[thirty-one] different branded pharmaceutical products
with combined annual U.S. sales of approximately $8.3 billion."47 It is estimated
that pay-for-delays from the past several years continue to "protect at least $20
billion in sales of brand-name pharmaceuticals from generic competition."48
38 FTC v.Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F 3 d 1298, 13o8-o9 (izth Cir. 2012), rev'd and remanded sub
nom., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
39 Id. at 1304.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1304-05.
43 Although, Watson agreed not to market the generic version until said date so long as no
other manufacturor did so during that time period. Id. at 1305.
44 Id.
45 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY, Supra note 9, at 2.
46 BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, at I (2012), available at http://wwwftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medi-
care-prescription-dnig-improvement-and/3oi7mmareport.pdf.
47 Id
48 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 9, at 2.
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C. Antitrust Actions in the Context ofPharmaceutical Pay-for-Delays
These pay-for-delay settlements "have attracted significant antitrust
scrutiny from both private plaintiffs and the government." 49 Arguably, large
reverse payment settlements are invalid under antitrust laws. In theory, the pay-
for-delay payment is indicative of the brand pharmaceutical company having
a weak patent that likely would be invalidated during litigation.so Therefore,
the payment serves as a way for the brand pharmaceutical company to retain
its monopoly, keeping the generic firm out of the market at the expense of
American consumers." The FTC and the Department of Justice have argued
extensively that pay-for-delays are presumptively unlawful under the Sherman
Act as unreasonable restraints on trade.52
The Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract . .. in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal."" A literal reading of the text would conclude that all agreements
restraining trade are illegal. However the Supreme Court has long construed
the Sherman Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints on trade.5 4 In antitrust
cases, the Court has consistently recognized that these analyses must "sensitively
... reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry
to which it applies" and therefore have analyzed these situations with three
different antitrust standards.ss
Generally, courts determine whether a restraint is reasonable based on the
rule of reason test: "[T]he finder of fact must decide whether the questioned
practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account
a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business,
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
49 Herman, supra note 23, at i8o.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.; see also FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F3 d 1298, 1308-09 (ith Cir. 2012), rev'd and
remanded sub nom., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) ("The FTC would like us to hold
that reverse payment settlements, like the ones in this case, are presumptively unlawful restraints
of trade. It argues that such settlements allow brand name and generic drug companies to be part-
ners in unlawful monopolies."); Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation
at i, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 E3 d 779 (2d Cir. 2010) (No.
05-285i-cv(L)) ('Reverse payment' agreements that delay entry by a potential generic competitor
in exchange for a payment from a branded drug manufacturer with market power presumptively
violate Section i of the Sherman Act.").
53 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
54 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2849 (2013); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman Act,
by its terms, prohibits every agreement 'in restraint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.").
55 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtiz V.Trinko, LLP,540 U.S. 398,411-12 (2004)
(quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (ist Cir. 1990)).
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history, nature, and effect."56
Courts apply a second standard-the per se rule-where restraints on trade
are predictable and have a very limited potential for pro-competitive benefits.5 7
Courts deem horizontal price fixing, output limitations, market allocation, and
group boycotts as unlawful practices under the per se rule.ss "[T]o condemn a
restraint asper se illegal, the courts must have had sufficient experience with the
particular type of restraint to be able to predict ... the rule of reason would also
condemn the same restraint.""
A third standard, the "quick look" rule of reason analysis, falls between
the full rule of reason inquiry and the rigid per se approach.60 This analysis is
applied when a plaintiff can show "that the defendant has engaged in practices
similar to those subject to per se treatment."" Under this analysis the defendant
is charged with the burden of demonstrating pro-competitive justifications and
the plaintiff is relieved of showing anti-competitive effects within the market.6 2
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Prior to guidance from the Supreme Court, courts of appeals applied two
different tests to determine the validity of pharmaceutical pay-for-delays.63
The Second, Federal, and Eleventh Circuits aligned and applied a scope of the
patent test under which reverse payments are upheld so long as the exclusion
does not exceed the patent's scope, the patent holder's claim of infringement
was not objectively baseless, and the patent was not procured by fraud.64 The
56 In re K-DurAntitrustLitig., 686 F 3d at 209 (quoting State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at io) ("This
inquiry has been divided into three parts. First, the plaintiffimust show that the challenged conduct
has produced anti-competitive effects within the market. If the plaintiff meets the initial burden,
'the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently
pro-competitive objective.' Finally, the plaintiff can rebut the defendant's purported pro-competi-
tive justification by showing that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-com-
petitive objective." (citations omitted)).
57 Id
5 8 Id.
59 THOMAS V. VAKERICs, ANTITRUST BAsICs § 1.03 (ALM Media Properties, LLC 2013).
6o In re K-DurAntitrustLitig., 686 F 3 d at 209.
61 Seiko F. Okada, In Re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation: Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settle-
ments Go Beyond the "Scope ofthe Patent", 14 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 303,316 (2012).
62 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 E 3d at 209.
63 Compare id. at 218 ("[T]he finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade .. . ."), with In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F 3d 87,
213 (2d Cir. 2oo6), abrogatedby FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) ("[A]bsent an extension
of the monopoly beyond the patent's scope ... and absent fraud ... the question is whether the un-
derlying infringement lawsuit was 'objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits.') (quoting Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc.,508 U.S. 49, 6o (1993)).
64 See FTC v.Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F3 d 129 8,1 3 08 (ith Cit. 2012), rev'd and remanded, 133
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Third Circuit criticized this test and instead applied a quick look rule of reason
test, which treats reverse settlements as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint on trade. 65
A. Scope of the Patent Test
The Second Circuit first articulated the current scope of the patent test for
pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litigation." There, Imperial Chemical Industries ("Imperial") held the patent
to tamoxifen, the most widely prescribed drug for treating breast cancer and
the most prescribed cancer drug in the world.6' Four months after tamoxifen
was patented by Imperial, Barr (a competing pharmaceutical company) filed
an ANDA with the FDA seeking approval to market a generic version of
tamoxifen.61
Subsequently, Imperial filed a patent infringement suit against Barr.69
Eventually, the district court held Imperial's patent invalid because of Imperial's
improper disclosure regarding testing of tamoxifen.70 Imperial appealed the
lower court's ruling, but while the appeal was pending the parties reached a
settlement.7' This settlement provided that the patent owner (now Zeneca)
would pay Barr $21 million and give them a non-exclusive license to sell
Zeneca-manufactured tamoxifen in the United States under Barr's label.72
Additionally, Zeneca agreed to pay Barr's raw material supplier $9.5 million and
an additional $35.9 million over the following ten years.7 1 In return, Barr agreed
that it would not market its own generic version of tamoxifen until Zeneca's
patent expired. 74 Barr also understood that if another generic pharmaceutical
company attempted to market a version of tamoxifen then Barr would attempt
to prevent this by invoking the 1 80-day exclusivity right it possessed as the first
generic filer with the FDA. 7s Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Barr and
S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3 d 1323, 1333, 1336-37
(Fed. Cir. 2oo8), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen, 466 F 3d
at 212-13.
65 See K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F 3 d at 218.
66 See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212-13.
67 Id. at r93.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 193-94.
73 Id. at 194-
74 Id. at 193-94.
75 Id. at 194. "According to the plaintiffs, this understanding among the defendants effectively
forestalled the introduction of any generic version of tamoxifen, because, five years later-only a
few weeks before other generic manufacturers were able to begin marketing their own versions of
tamoxifen-Barr did in fact successfully claim entitlement to the exclusivity period."Id
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Zeneca filed a "Joint Motion to Dismiss the Appeal as Moot and to Vacate the
Judgment Below" which was granted by the circuit court, thereby vacating the
district court's earlier judgment that the patent was invalid."6
Zeneca brought subsequent patent infringement suits against other would-
be generic competitors who attempted to gain approval for tamoxifen generics. 7
Though litigation ensued, Zeneca was successful and the generic companies
were prohibited from marketing their generic versions until Zeneca's patent
expired.7 1 While Zeneca was litigating with the generic companies, consumers
and consumer groups filed thirty additional lawsuits challenging the legality of
the 1993 Settlement Agreement between Barr and Zeneca.79 These claims were
consolidated into In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation as a class action
complaint.so At the center of the litigation was the claim that the settlement
enabled Zeneca to evade the district court's invalidation of its tamoxifen patent,
which the plaintiffs argued would have been affirmed by the circuit court.s
Such a ruling would have allowed Barr to receive approval to market its generic
version of tamoxifen and, after the 180-day exclusivity period, allowed other
generics to enter the market as well, substantially decreasing the cost of the
drug.82 The district court granted Zeneca's motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs
appealed."
On appeal, the Second Circuit applied the scope of the patent test and
determined "that the Settlement Agreement did not unlawfully extend the
reach of Zeneca's tamoxifen patent," and, therefore, the settlement did not
restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The court said that "as long
as 'the patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless' or beyond
the patent's scope, the patentee can enter into a settlement 'to protect that to
which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and
distribution of the patented product."'ss The court explained that any damage
done to competition by reverse settlements is caused by the rightful monopoly
76 Id.
77 Id. at 194-95.
78 Id. at 196.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 196-97. "In the consolidated lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the Settlement Agree-
ment unlawfiully (i) enabled Zeneca and Barr to resuscitate a patent that the district court had
already held to be invalid and unenforceable; (2) facilitated Zeneca's continuing monopolization
of the market for tamoxifen; (3) provided for the sharing of unlawful monopoly profits between
Zeneca and Barr; (4) maintained an artificially high price for tamoxifen; and (5) prevented competi-
tion from other generic manufacturers of tamoxifen."Id.
81 Id. at 197.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 213-14.
85 Michael A. Carrier, Why the "Scope of the Patent" Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settle-
ment Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. I, 3 (2012), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/scopeofthepatent.pdf
(citing In re Tamoxxfen, 466 F3 d at 208-09, 213).
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created by patent law, unless the terms of the settlement enlarge the scope of
the monopoly."
Applying the test, the court first considered whether the settlement agreement
extended the patent monopoly by "restraining the introduction or marketing
of unrelated or non-infringing products" and found that it did not." Second,
the court considered whether the settlement agreement ended the litigation
between Zeneca and Barr and opened the patent up to subsequent challenges
by other potential generic manufactures, which the settlement did." Lastly, the
court considered whether all competition in the market was foreclosed by the
settlement agreement and found that such competition was not totally stifled
because the settlement "allowed Barr to begin marketing Zeneca's version of
tamoxifen eight months after the settlement agreement became effective," thus
adding a competitor into the market." Based on these considerations, the court
concluded that absent any plausible allegations that the settlement provided
Zeneca with benefits outside the scope of the tamoxifen patent there was no
claim for relief and thus no antitrust violation. 90
1. The Rationale Underlying the Scope of the Patent Test.-The Second Circuit
and other courts justify the decision to apply the scope of the patent test upon
encouraging settlements, continuing to encourage innovation, and being a
natural byproduct of the Hatch Waxman Act.91
First, courtsjustify their decision by citing their general stance on encouraging
settlements. Settlement agreements, even in the context of pay-for-delays, are
favored because they provide a number of private and social benefits compared
to litigation.92 For instance, settlements allow for the conservation of judicial
resources and save litigation expenses, which can reach millions of dollars per
each side.93
Next, the decision to use the scope of the patent test is premised on the fear
that laws and decisions severely restricting patent settlements would increase
litigation, heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents, and therefore delay
86 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F 3d at 212-13.
87 Id. at 213-14 ("Because Zeneca's patent therefore precludes all generic versions of tamoxi-
fen, so that any such competing version would, as we understand it, necessarily infringe the patent,
the Settlement Agreement did not, by precluding the manufacture of a generic version of tamoxi-
fen, restrain the marketing of any non-infringing products.").
88 Id. at 214-15.
89 Id. at 215.
90 Id. at 216.
91 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F 3d at 201-06; see also Hemphill, supra note 15, at 1573-77 (discussing
four overlapping justifications that have "supported the courts'willingness to overlook the allocative
harm" pay-for-delays cause).
92 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F-3d at 202.
93 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw AssN, REPORT OF THE EcoNoMIC SURVEY 2011, at35 (20z)
(stating that in patent litigation with more than s25 million at risk the median expense per side of
the litigation was s4.5 million).
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innovation.9 4 Innovation is especially important to society in the context of
pharmaceuticals. For example, in 2011, thirty-four new drugs were developed,
the most in any year in the last decade.95 Courts are concerned that if
pharmaceutical reverse settlements are discouraged then brand companies will
lose part of their economic incentive for developing and creating new drugs. In
essence, expensive new drugs are better than no new drugs at all.
Lastly, courts have noted that reverse settlements are a product of the
regulatory framework of the Hatch Waxman Act.96 In this context, when the
brand pharmaceutical patent holder brings a suit for patent infringement,
the prospective generic has yet to incur substantial expenses in marketing or
distributing their drug.97 Therefore, at the time of suit, the prospective generic
company has relatively little to lose in litigation." Conversely, the brand
pharmaceutical's "risk if it loses the resulting patent suit is correspondingly
large: It will be stripped of its patent monopoly" and lose millions of dollars
in profits. 9 Based upon the fact that the Hatch Waxman Act "essentially
redistributes the relative risk assessments"'00 between the patent holder and the
possible patent infringer, courts have recognized the need for settlement funds
to protect the patent holder's interests."0
2. Disadvantages of Applying the Scope of the Patent Test.-Courts and
commentators alike have heavily criticized the scope of the patent test. Critics
argue that the "test's almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity ....
assumes away the question beinglitigated in the underlying patent suit, enforcing
a presumption that the patent holder would have prevailed."102 Arguably,
this test protects intellectual property on the strength of the pharmaceutical
company's wallet-and not on the strength of the patent.03 This is because a
pharmaceutical company can provide a large reverse settlement to a generic
company to end the litigation and continue its exclusive patent, regardless of
the actual strength of the patent, so long as the antitrust litigation is not baseless
94 In re Tamoxifen, 466 E3d at 203.
95 IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATIcs, Supra note 14, at 6.
96 See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206-07; Hemphill, supra note 15, at 1577.
97 In re Tamoxifen, 466 E3d at 206-07.
98 Id
99 Id. at 207.
too Id.
505 See id.
1o2 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3 d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2849 (2013).
103 See id. at 215 ("[W]e question the assumption underlying the view of the Second Circuit
and other courts that subsequent challenges by other generic manufacturers will suffice to eliminate
weak patents preserved through a reverse payment to the initial challenger ... [T]he high profit
margins of a monopolist drug manufacturer may enable it to pay off a whole series of challengers
rather than suffer the possible loss of its patent through litigation.").
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or a sham.'0 In reality, the validity of the patent should be the center of the
antitrust analysis because if the patent is valid then a reverse settlement likely
falls within the scope of the patent and avoids an antitrust problem. Whereas,
if the patent is invalid then a reverse settlement resembles market allocation, a
severe anticompetitive harm and violation of antitrust law, because the patent
has to ability to exclude other manufacturers. 0 A presumption that the patent
is valid seems to be misplaced as generic pharmaceutical manufacturers have
prevailed in 73% of patent infringement suits fully litigated between 1992 and
2000.'G
Additionally, critics argue that the scope of the patent test is inconsistent
with the primary goal of the Hatch Waxman Act.107 The Act sought to increase
the availability of low-cost generic drugs to the public by encouraging generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers to challenge weak brand patents.'o But the
test "entitles the patent holder to pay its potential generic competitors not to
compete," without consideration of the validity of the patent.'09 By allowing
reverse settlements, brand drugs are able to monopolize the market and-even
with a weak patent-charge consumers up to ten times more than a prospective
generic alternative." 0 Therefore, reverse settlements are limiting the public's
access to affordable generics in direct opposition to the Hatch Waxman Act
and at a cost to the American people of an estimated $3.5 billion a year."
B. Quick Look Rule ofReason Analysis
In 2012, the Third Circuit promulgated a new quick look test for
pharmaceutical reverse settlements in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation."12
This litigation stemmed from a formulation patent held by Schering-Plough
Corporation ("Schering") for a controlled release coating used in their K-Dur
20, a sustained-release potassium chloride supplement used to treat potassium
deficiencies. Almost six years after the patent was issued, Upsher-Smith
Laboratories ("Upsher") filed the first ANDA seeking approval to produce
a generic version of K-Dur 20, causing Schering to sue Upsher for patent
infringement."' Upsher argued vehemently that its generic did not violate
the patent due, to differences in the chemical composition of their controlled
104 Carrier, supra note 8s, at 3.
105 Id. at 6.
lo6 FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIc DRUG ENTRY, Supra note 35, at 9-i0, 16.
107 See In re K-DurAntitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 217.
108 See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. i, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-
48.
109 In re K-DurAntitrust Litig., 686 F 3d at 217.
no FED.TRADE COMMN, PAY-FOR-DELAY, Supra note 9, at i.
in Id. at 2.
u2 In re K-DurAntitrust Litig., 686 F.3 d at 218.
113 Id. at 205.
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release coating.114 Upsher even went so far as to claim that Schering's claims of
infringement were baseless and not made in good faith.115
Predictably, as the district court considered the motions for summary
judgment-and hours before the ruling was issued-the parties reached a
settlement.1 6 The settlement provided that Upsher would refrain from marketing
its generic or any similar product until September 1, 2001, and then it would
receive a non-royalty non-exclusive license to sell a generic."' Additionally,
Upsher "granted Schering licenses to make and sell several pharmaceutical
products Upsher had developed," an agreement made in response to Schering's
concerns, raised during negotiations, about possible antitrust problems
that might arise from providing a reverse settlement to Upsher.1is However,
subsequent to the settlement, Schering abandoned plans to utilize the licenses
obtained from Upsher.11' In return, Schering agreed to pay $60 million over
three years plus additional smaller sums depending upon its use of the licenses
provided by Upsher.120
Subsequently, Schering entered into another settlement with a generic
company to protect this same patent. ESI Lederle ("ESI") filed an ANDA
to develop a generic version of K-Dur 20. Again, Schering sued for patent
infringement and ESI defended on the grounds that its generic differed in
the number of ingredients per layer of coating.121 Schering and ESI settled
the case prior to the court rendering a decision: ESI agreed not to market
the generic until January 1, 2004, when it would receive a royalty-free license,
and represented that it was not developing or planning to develop any other
potassium chloride product.122 In return, Schering agreed to pay ESI $5 million
initially and then an additional payment ranging from $10 million to $625,000
depending upon when ESI's ANDA was approved.123
As a result, various private parties filed a class action antitrust suit attacking
these settlements as unreasonable restraints on trade. 124 The district court
applied the scope of the patent test, but the Third Circuit formulated their
own quick look test to deal with pharmaceutical reverse settlements. 125 "The
114 Id.
115 Id.
16 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 205-06.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2o6.
122 Id.
123 Id
124 Id. at 2o6-07. The FTC also brought a complaint against Schering, ultimately ruling that
the reverse payment settlement was illegal.'Ihis decision was overruled by the Eleventh Circuit. See
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F 3d ro56 (rith Cir. 2005).
125 Id. at 208, 218.
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court's decision to apply this analysis highlights the court's view that reverse
payment settlements are by nature similar to transactions that are held to be per
se unlawful, such as horizontal price fixing."126 The quick look test specifically
requires:
[T]he finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder to a
generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima
facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, which could be rebutted
by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry
or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.
For a reverse settlement to beat this presumption of illegality, the court explained
that a patent holder could argue that "there is in fact has no reverse payment
because any money that changed hands was for something other than a delay
in market entry."128 Alternatively, in rare situations the patent holder could
argue that a reverse payment actually increased competition. 2 9 To illustrate, the
court noted that, "a modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic
manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug might
have an overall effect of increasing the amount of competition in the market.""'3
1. The Rationale Underlying the Quick Look Rule ofReason Analysis.-The Third
Circuit and proponents of the analysis justify their reliance on the quick look
test on the basis that it is consistent with the Hatch Waxman Act and creates
the correct presumption of illegality called for under antitrust laws.
First, proponents argue that the quick look rule of reason analysis is
consistent with the Hatch Waxman Act's goal of increasing the availability of
low-cost generic drugs."' The Act attempts to encourage generic manufacturers
to litigate challenges against weak patents so consumers can ultimately benefit
from lower drug prices.1 2 The quick look test furthers this goal by preventing
brand pharmaceutical companies from entering into reverse settlements and
assumes that without the settlements, litigation would continue and potentially
result in invalidation of the brand patent. The ultimate result would allow that
particular generic into the market and, after its 180-day exclusivity period, other
generics would enter the market as well. This would increase the availability of
low-cost generic pharmaceuticals to the general public and fulfill the primary
objective of the Hatch Waxman Act.
Additionally, proponents argue that the quick look rule of reason
test correctly presumes the illegality of reverse settlements. Arguably, the
presumption created "is warranted because of the extremely anticompetitive
126 Okada, supra note 61, at 327.
127 In re K-DurAntitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 218.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 217-18.
132 Id. at 217 (citing S. REP. No.10 7-16 7, at 4 (2002)).
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nature of a reverse payment settlement in general."13 1 Proponents liken these
pharmaceutical reverse settlements to horizontal price fixing, which has been
deemed an unlawful antitrust practice.'34 The applicable antitrust standard is
then the quick look rule of reason analysis because the brand generics have
engaged in practices similar to horizontal price fixing, which is subject to per
se treatment.135
2. Disadvantages ofApplying the Quick Look ofReason Analysis.-'There are many
disadvantages of applying the quicklookof reason analysis.The most compelling
argument against the adoption of this analysis is that it disincentivizes the
creation of new pharmaceuticals.
First, the quick look test could greatly hamper the innovation and
development process ofcreating new drugs. Because reverse settlements increase
the value of the brand's underlying patent, they arguably enhance the consumer
welfare by increasing the brand pharmaceutical's "incentive to innovate, as
well as its financial ability to research, develop, and market future drugs.""' By
applying a presumption of illegality to reverse settlements in the quick look
rule of reason analysis, pharmaceuticals will have to choose either to abandon
patent infringement suits against generics and lose profits as the generic enters
the market, or fully litigate the patent infringement suit and expend millions of
dollars on increased litigation expenses."' Either option decreases the incentive
to invest in research for new medications and technologies since companies'
ability to recoup their expenditures and keep generics out of the market has
been greatly reduced. Though Americans want access to cheap generics, it
seems that this analysis will hurt the public in general because it will limit their
access to new medications that have increased effectiveness or fight novel or
currently untreatable diseases.
Others dispute the above argument, but believe that the quick look rule of
reason analysis would have several unintended consequences. First, it might
actually discourage potential generic manufacturers from bringing patent
challenges in the first place.' Generic companies may lack adequate liquidity
to fully defend against a patent infringement case and, with little hope for a
settlement, might be discouraged from attempting to enter the market early
in contravention of a brand patent based upon their economic position. This
133 Okada, supra note 61, at 331.
134 Id. at 327.
135 Id.
136 Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts
Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent
Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 90 (2010).
137 See Okada, supra note 61, at 333 ("Nevertheless, when companies are prohibited from set-
ding with large reverse payment deals, they may choose to litigate patent challenge suits to the end
138 Id. at 334.
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would be contrary to the congressional intent underlying the Hatch Waxman
Act. 139
Additionally, applying the quick look rule of reason analysis may not
effectively eliminate reverse payment settlements'" because of its first exception,
which provides that the presumption of illegality can be reversed by showing
that the payment from the brand to the generic was for a purpose other than
delayed entry.141 Therefore, this rule may encourage pharmaceutical companies
to enter into settlement deals which attempt to "hid[e] reverse payments in a
series of complex transactions" where the brand receives additional licensing
rights, patent rights, or something else of value in addition to the generic
agreeing not to enter the market. 1 42 This would reverse the presumption, because
arguably the payment from the brand company to the generic company was not
for the generic company's agreement to stay out of the market, but instead for
other considerations.
III. THE SUPREME COURT's DECISION IN FTC v. AcTAvis
The Supreme Court recently considered which test should be applied to
pharmaceutical reverse settlements in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.143 However, the
Court failed to endorse either the scope of the patent test or the quick look rule
of reason analysis. Instead, the Court decided that in this particular case, "the
FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim.""
The Court's conclusion rested on five sets of considerations: "the
specific restraint at issue 'ha[d] the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition"; 145 the "anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes
prove unjustified"; "where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that
harm about in practice"; "an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible
administratively"; and allowing for some type of antitrust analysis of reverse
payments "does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuits."'"
Additionally, the Court stated that a quick look rule of reason analysis is
not appropriate because "the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the
payor's anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services
139 Id.
140 See id. at 335-
141 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2849 (2013).
142 Okada, supra note 61, at 336.
143 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
144 Id. at 2234.
145 Id. (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,460 (1986)).
146 Id. at 2234-37.
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for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing
justification."147 The Supreme Court instructed the lower court to reconsider
the antitrust issue, but did not provide further guidance on how to determine
whether a reverse payment violated antitrust law. The Court's closing remarks
fail to help clarify the situation: "there is always something of a sliding scale in
appraising reasonableness, and as such the quality of proof required should vary
with the circumstances."1 48
IV. NEW PROPOSED BALANCING TEST
The Supreme Court's analysis leaves the lower courts still looking for a
framework under which they can properly analyze a reverse settlement's
anticompetitive effect. The Court determined that neither analysis struck the
proper balance between the competing interests of the pharmaceutical industry
and antitrust law.149 These interests include:
[O]n one side, the encouragement of innovation fostered by the patent laws,
the public and private interest in amicable settlements, and judicial economy;
and, on the other side, an interest in vigorous competition protected by the
Sherman Act as well as the interest of consumers in having the validity of a
patent litigated."so
Consequently, the Court determined that there is a need for a new mode of
analysis, but failed to identify the proper test.
The best solution is to adopt a balancing test. This test will
assess the reasonableness of the restraint on trade, consistent
with antitrust law's recognition that potential antitrust analysis
"must sensitively .. . reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the
regulated industry to which it applies".' This analysis fits squarely into the
rule of reason test, which is utilized most frequently in antitrust contexts and
involves determining whether there has been an unreasonable restraint on
competition by considering "a variety of factors, including specific information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect."15 2 A balancing test is the
147 Id. at 2237.
148 Id. at 2237-38 (quoting California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999)) (internal
quotations omitted).
149 See generally Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223.
150 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 E3 d 187, 221 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (PoolerJ., dissenting).
151 Verizon Commc'ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 4x1-12
(2004) (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F2d 17, 22 (Ist Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see In re Tamoxifen, 466 E3d at 228 (PoolerJ., dissenting).
152 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 E3 d 197, 218 (3 d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citations omitted) ("This inquiry
has been divided into three parts. First, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct has
2013- 20141 519
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
superior mode of analysis because it "allows courts to analyze specific reverse-
payment settlements contextually and then develop the analysis as they gain
experience .... "is5
The proper balancing test should weigh the strength of the patent at the
time of the settlement, the settlement's anticompetitive effect on the market,
and the extent the reverse settlement is necessary to promote innovation. 'Ihis
test is a better fit because it considers the patent strength and then considers
the anticompetitive effects, while also giving weight to the pharmaceutical
company's ability to recoup expenditures and maximize profits, thereby
incentivizing new drug development.
A. Balancing Test Mechanics
1. First Consideration: Strength of the Patent.-First, in considering whether
a pay-for-delay from a brand to a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer is
reasonable, the courts should consider the strength of the patent at the time
of the settlement. This is a crucial inquiry "[bjecause the essence of a patent is
the monopoly or exclusionary power it confers upon the holder, analyzing the
lawfulness of the acquisition of a patent necessitates that we primarily focus
upon the circumstances of the acquiring party and the status of the relevant
product .... "154
If there is a judicial determination that the patent is valid then the brand
pharmaceutical has the ability to exclude the generic for a specified time, based
on an infringement claim. In this situation, a reverse settlement does not
unreasonably restrain trade because the monopoly is valid under patent law.
Therefore, a valid patent leans in favor of allowing the reverse settlement because
its purpose is to defray litigation costs and end the controversy. However, if the
judiciary has determined that the patent is invalid, then the monopoly that the
brand is paying to retain is unjustified and tends to unreasonably restrict trade
in violation of the antitrust laws.
In the absence of any findings by a court as to the strength or validity
of the patent, the antitrust court should conduct its own mini trial on the
patent-infringement merits."ss A mini trial is advantageous because it avoids
unnecessary costs and improves judicial efficiency.1 s6 This "allows the court to
produced anti-competitive effects within the market. If the plaintiff meets the initial burden,'the
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-
competitive objective.' Finally, the plaintiff can rebut the defendant's purported pro-competitive
justification by showing that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competi-
tive objective.")).
153 Butler &Jarosch, supra note 136, at 114 (discussing the traditional rule of reason analysis).
154 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1981).
155 See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement ofPatent Infringement Lawsuits:Antitrust
Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747,783 (2002).
156 See id at 785-88.
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make use of a mini trial on the merits that has already occurred in the patent-
infringement case to avoid rehashing the merits in antitrust."5
In cases without a completed action on the validity of the patent and
infringement issue, or in the absence of a preliminary injunction in favor of the
patent holder, employing this approach of a mini trial will increase litigation
expenses. However, the cost is justified by the importance of the consideration
and allows courts and parties to set further limits and restrictions, to prevent
the mini trial from becoming a full-blown patent infringement suit.
2. Second Consideration: Settlements Anticompetitive Effect on the Market.-
Second, in considering the reasonableness of a reverse settlement the court
should consider the settlement's effect on competition. This consideration
focuses on whether the settlement has a procompetitive or an anticompetitive
effect on the market. Courts should have ample leeway to consider all relevant
concerns in this area. A settlement with a procompetitive effect or only a slight
anticompetitive effect may be reasonable in light of the other considerations.
Specific considerations include: the effect of side deals on the overall market
competition, the strength of the brand's particularized market, whether the
scope of the patent was exceeded, the entrance date allowed by the reverse
payment settlement, and the generic's ability to market the drug without a
reverse payment.
Courts should consider the effect of side deals on competition in the
market as well. Including side deals in reverse settlements can help negate
possible anticompetitive effects of the settlement by increasing competition for
other drugs and resulting in procompetitive benefits. For example, if a reverse
settlement includes the right or license for the brand pharmaceutical to market
and sell drug A that at that time is sold by the generic company, then market
competition has increased for drug A, likely resulting in lower consumer
prices."s' Side deals can increase the procompetitive effect of a settlement.
Courts should also examine the strength of the brand's particularized
market. A patent holder's market power is an important consideration in
determining the effect of limiting consumer access to a specific generic. A
showing that the generic could not meaningfully increase competition in an
already competitive market would suggest that the reverse settlement has no
anticompetitive effect.'
In addition, courts should compare the scope of the patent with the terms
of the reverse settlement. If the settlement attempts to extend the monopoly
157 Butler &Jarosch, supra note 136, at 1o9.
158 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F 3 d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted andjudgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013). As part of the reverse settlement, Upsher (the generic) granted Schering (the brand)
licenses "to make and sell several pharmaceutical products Upsher had developed, including Nia-
cor-SR, a sustained-release niacin product used to treat high cholesterol." Id. at 205.
159 See Butler &Jarosch, supra note 136, at 116.
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past the generic entry date as determined by law, or includes restrictions on
other drugs or mechanisms not covered by the patent, then the settlement is
anticompetitive. In such an agreement, even with a valid patent, the brand
pharmaceutical company is prohibited from excluding more than what the
patent protects in a settlement. Therefore, when a settlement's terms exceed
the scope of the patent the settlement leans towards having an anticompetitive
effect.
Courts should also recognize the procompetitive market effects of a
reverse settlement that allows generic entry prior to the patent expiration. "If
the negotiated entry date is significantly before the date that the patent will
expire, the agreement is not likely to be anticompetitive" and instead, is actually
increasing competition and consumers' access to low-cost generics.16o
Another relevant factor to consider is whether, without the reverse
settlement, the generic would have been capable of marketing the drug. Proof
that a generic "would never have been able to market the generic drug without
the reverse payment suggests that there is no anticompetitive effect."1 6 1 This
will likely be applicable in limited situations where the generic drug company
has limited liquidity, would not be able to afford a patent-infringement trial,
or would likely go out of business prior to marketing the drug. 6 2 In limited
circumstances, a reverse settlement may have a procompetitive effect on the
market because the payment may save the cash-poor generic manufacturer and
allow for the generic to eventually enter the market at the time negotiated for
in the settlement.1 63
3. 7hird Consideration: Encourage Innovation.-Lastly, in determining the
reasonableness of a reverse settlement the court should consider the extent that
the settlement is necessary to continue encouraging pharmaceutical companies
to develop new drugs. Specifically, this is where the current tests-the scope
of the patent test and the quick look rule of reason analysis-fail, as neither
consider the important goal of promoting pharmaceutical innovation that
increases consumer access to new or more effective drugs.
Therefore, to adequately incentivize drug innovation, brand pharmaceuticals
need to be allowed to recoup reasonable expenses and collect some profit from
their new drugs or technology. Courts should consider a brand manufacturer's
total expenditure for developing and marketing its drug, compared with the
amount of time it has operated a market monopoly and the amount of profits
collected. With that said, courts should be weary of accepting exaggerated or
inflated expenses and partial or incomplete profit estimates. To this end, courts
should compare estimates to data available for other drugs similarly situated.
In general, timing may play a crucial role in courts evaluating this factor. For
16o Id.
161 Id. at I1S.
162 Id.
163 See id.
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example, a reverse settlement may appear reasonable where the brand has
only entered the market four months prior to a settlement, but would likely
be considered unreasonable where the brand has had a monopoly for seven-
and-a-half years. Courts should keep reasonableness in mind when evaluating
this factor.5 *
B. Advantages
By balancing all of the relevant considerations and considering the context
and effect of the reverse settlement, this reasonable test emerges as the clear
winner. This test strikes a better balance because it encourages innovation
through consideration of a settlement's effect on incentivizing invention rather
than unnecessarily favoring antitrust law or patent law, is flexible enough to
meet the needs of the pharmaceutical context, and is consistent with antitrust
law and American jurisprudence on settlements.
First, this test provides for a balancing of all the relevant interests and does
not tilt the scale unnecessarily to one side. The scope of the patent test is too
favorable to the pharmaceutical companies. 6 s It "assumes away the question
being litigated in the underlying patent suit, enforcing a presumption that the
patent holder would have prevailed," therefore protecting intellectual property
on the strength of the brand pharmaceutical manufacturer's wallet and not on
the strength of the patent.'66 On the other side of the spectrum, the quick
look rule of reason analysis favors the other side by presuming that reverse
settlements are always illegal unless a narrow exception applies. This balancing
test finds a middle ground and gives a voice to each side. Patent law is protected
by considering the validity of the actual patent, antitrust law is adequately
represented by addressing the anticompetitive effect of the settlement on the
whole market, and the importance of incentivizing innovation to increase the
public's access to novel drugs and drug technologies is accounted for.
Second, this test is flexible enough to meet the needs of any pharmaceutical
pay-for-delay settlement. The factors are broad enough that the court can
consider all relevant factors involved in each individual case, allowing for a
more particularized inquiry. This protects the pharmaceutical companies from
overgeneralized rules that fail to adequately address the relevant concerns
164 Reasonableness is an important consideration. For example, if a drug company expended
four times the average investment to develop a drug with a very limited market, and then entered
into a reverse settlement after enjoying six years of a monopoly, the agreement might lean on the
side of being an unreasonable restraint on trade in light of the circumstances. However, where a
drug company has reasonably researched and developed a new drug and has had enjoyed only a
short period of monopoly power, a reverse settlement might be a reasonable restraint on trade to
protect the pharmaceutical companies and promote innovation for the American consumer.
165 See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing scope of the patent test disadvantages).
166 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment
vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013); see Hemphill, supra note 15, at 1614.
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and nuances in their cases. Additionally, with experience gained through
implementation of the balancing test, courts may add to or take away from
the current framework to provide for a better analysis and are not barred from
doing so by unfounded presumptions against or for legality.
Third, this test is consistent with current jurisprudence. Regarding antitrust
law, the scope of the patent test does not fit into traditional antitrust analysis
and therefore fails to analyze the issue with respect to those considerations.
Additionally, the application of the quick look rule of reason test is at odds with
antitrust law because "[t]o apply the quick look, courts must find activity that has
a clear and obvious anticompetitive nature."1 6 7 Reverse payments do not meet
this standard because they can either be procompetitive or anticompetitive. 6 s
This balancing test is more consistent with antitrust law because it tracks the
traditional rule of reason analysis for antitrust cases, which requires the finder
of fact to determine whether the practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition while considering a variety of factors, including specifics about
the particular business and the restraint's history, nature, and effect.16 Further,
unlike the quick look rule of reason analysis, this balancing test is also consistent
with American jurisprudence that favors settlement over litigation.
CONCLUSION
In the pharmaceutical context, the intersection between patent law, antitrust
law, and the Hatch Waxman Act leads to a unique issue of pay-for-delay
settlements, which cost Americans $3.5 billion a year. The tension is palpable
between patent law's interest in encouraging innovation, promoting amicable
settlements, and increasing judicial economy, and antitrust law's and the Hatch
Waxman Act's vigorous support of competition to increase the availability of
low-cost generic alternatives. The circuit split illustrated two modes of analysis,
both of which failed to provide for a comprehensive framework to determine
the legality of particular pharmaceutical reverse settlement. The scope of the
patent test failed to engage in antitrust analysis, and the quick look rule of
reason analysis incorrectly assumed that reverse settlements are anticompetitive.
The Supreme Court did not endorse either test, however also did not provide
enough guidance for lower courts on how to deal with reverse settlements.
This Note advocates for the adoption of a new balancing test that considers
the reasonableness of the settlement and is consistent with antitrust traditional
rule of reason analyses. The test properly weighs all of the competing interests
in the pharmaceutical context by considering the validity or strength of the
patent at the time of the settlement, the settlement's anticompetitive effects,
and the need for the settlement to promote innovation. The balancing test is
167 Butler &Jarosch, supra note 136, at 114.
168 See id. at 115.
169 See In re K-DurAntitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 209.
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flexible enough to meet the particular needs of the pharmaceutical industry and
provide protection to allow for some settlements, and yet is stringent enough to
protect consumers from unfair restraints on trade. Additionally, the balancing
test is in line with current antitrust reviewing standards and American
jurisprudence favoring settlements. For these reasons, the balancing test offers
the best judicial solution for determining whether a reverse settlement is legal.

